Abstract: This paper examines how established firms create new (radical) technologies by re-deploying existing knowledge into other domains than those in which that knowledge was originally accumulated. Drawing from the strategy and the innovation research, the analysis focuses on some of the mechanisms firms can use in developing a new technology. More specifically, we study the following mechanisms: the role of internal vs. collaborative R&D; the breadth of firm's search behaviour; the scope of this firm's R&D activity; the importance of individual inventors relative to the teams of inventors in new technology developments. We trace Corning's invention and the development of fibre optics over the period of 1970-1995 using multiple sources of data and information. The analysis shows that Corning developed fibre optics mostly inhouse by leveraging its stock of knowledge into a new application domain, i.e., long-distance telecommunications. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
Introduction
A central theme in strategy and innovation research is the notion that superior performance rests on the ability to develop consistently new technologies (Nelson, 1991; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000) . However, models of technological evolution describe the technology life cycle as characterised by periods of incremental innovation that are punctuated by sudden bursts of radical innovations spurring the emergence of new technologies (e.g. Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Mokyr, 1990) . During these periods of rapid change new entrants tend to outperform incumbents (see Henderson and Clark, 1990) . Prior research has explained this pattern by arguing that existing firms face the risk of falling into competency traps (Levitt and March, 1988) under-investing in radical innovation (Henderson, 1993) or being held captive of their mainstream customers (Christensen, 1997) .
In spite of this large body of empirical evidence, incumbents' failure to embrace new technologies is not universal. As several studies (e.g. Methe et al., 1997; Rosenbloom, 2000; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001 ) have shown, some incumbents adapt, survive and even regain historic performance levels in markets shaken by the arrival of radical technological innovations (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) . Moreover, incumbent firms often pioneer radical technologies (Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986; Burgelman, 1994; Christensen, 1997) . There is indeed 'significant variation in the relative performance of incumbent enterprises following a technological discontinuity' (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) . Yet, these studies typically focus on the case where incumbents innovate or react to technological innovations introduced by other firms -whether diversifying entrants or newly founded firms -within an existing domain (i.e. market or industry).
The case where established firms develop radical technologies in a different domain than those in which they are currently competing has received less attention. From this perspective, new technologies emerge from re-deploying existing technological knowledge into new domains of application (see Levinthal, 1998; Adner and Levinthal, 2002; Cattani, 2006) . In the process of adapting to new customers' needs and performance requirements an existing technology can in fact evolve into a different one. The purpose of this paper is to further investigate this dynamics by focusing on one radical innovation created by an incumbent. We believe any such study to be particularly important to sharpen our understanding of the origins of radical innovations and the factors enabling incumbents to remain innovative over time.
Drawing from extant strategy and innovation research, we turn the attention to some of the mechanisms firms can use in the development of new technologies: the role of internal vs. collaborative R&D (e.g. joint ventures or alliances) breadth of a firm's search behaviour, i.e. whether it engages in exploitation or exploration; the scope of a firm R&D activity, i.e. whether it tends to concentrate on a few or to span several technical domains; the extent to which a new technology is developed by individual inventors or a team of inventors working together. These mechanisms differ with respect to the locus -either internal or external -where the relevant knowledge resides (e.g. Roberts and Berry, 1985) . These mechanisms are complementary and firms can activate them separately or jointly. Our objective is to study their relative importance in the invention and subsequent development of a new (radical) technology. Rather than testing a well-defined set of hypotheses, the aim is to generate new insight that might eventually be tested empirically.
The analysis focuses on Corning's invention and development of fibre optics, which we trace over the period . Fibre optics technology grew largely out of Corning's long-standing expertise in specialty glass and had a radical impact within the telecommunications industry (see Berry, 1993; Trajtenberg et al., 1997) . We chose the year 1970 as the beginning of the observation period because the first key patents that laid out the foundations for the practical implementation of optical fibre were filed in that year (for a more detailed discussion, see Cattani, 2006) . Based on Abetti and Stuart's (1986) method for measuring the uniqueness of a technological innovation, fibre optics technology can be viewed as an instance of highly radical innovations 1 . While fibre optics initially targeted the need of long-distance telephone companies -a new unfamiliar market for Corning -some of the main features of this novel technology overlapped with existing corporate technological skills and knowledge (Roberts and Berry, 1985) . Significant variations in the market space do not always command comparable variations in the technology space (Adner and Levinthal, 2002) . But for the long-distance telecommunications market fibre optics was a truly radical innovation, which eventually displaced the dominant technology, i.e. copperbased fibres. In the analysis we use multiple types of data -i.e. patent, archival and interview data. The dependent variable measures the impact of each fibre optics patent as captured by future citations from patents filed by other firms than Corning. We want in fact to estimate the influence of the above mechanisms on the quality of Corning's fibre optics patents.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly present the theory and discuss the four areas of interest. In Section 3, we describe the empirical setting, the data, the model and methods we used in the analysis. We summarise findings in Section 4. Relying on the qualitative evidence from our archival and interview data, in Section 5 we further interpret results and implications that descend from them. In particular, we examine some of the organisational practices and conditions that arguably enhanced Corning's ability to develop new technologies (most notably, fibre optics). We then conclude in Section 6 with the contributions, limitations and possible extensions for future research.
Theory
Firms can create new technologies by building absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 ) in a specific domain for which their R&D is relatively well defined (e.g. Moore's law in the semiconductor industry); or by exploring a new domain with different customers' needs and performance requirements (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Levinthal, 1998) . While previous research has extensively investigated the first case, the second has received relatively less attention. According to the latter perspective, firms can develop a new technology and even initiate a new technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982) by leveraging earlier experience across different technological domains (Levinthal, 1998; Adner and Levinthal, 2002; Cattani, 2006) .
Similarly, research on industry evolution and firm heterogeneity has recently examined under which conditions earlier experience might prove advantageous in new technology developments and subsequent market applications. Summarising a vast body of prior work, Helfat and Lieberman (2002) argued that the degree of similarity between a firm's 'pre-entry resources and capabilities' and those required in a new domain positively affects not only the decision to enter the new domain, but also the ability to innovate and then prosper in it. Several longitudinal studies have found supporting evidence for the similarity effect. Carroll et al. (1996) showed how firms entering the American automobile industry from related industries survived longer than newly founded firms or firms from unrelated industries. Also, Klepper and Simons (2000) found that firms with experience in radio manufacture entered the TV industry faster, were more innovative, achieved greater market share and survived longer than firms with no radio production experience. Other studies have produced consistent results across different industries (e.g. King and Tucci, 2002; Klepper, 2002; Cattani, 2005) .
An important implication of these studies is that many innovations originate from the re-deployment of existing knowledge into a different domain. The same body of knowledge can in fact enhance the ability to generate (economically valuable) innovations in domains with similar technological roots even when they are distinct from a user's perspective. As we noted before, significant variations in the market space do not always command comparable variations in the technology space (Adner and Levinthal, 2002) . Firms that systematically search for new applications for which their stock of knowledge is potentially valuable and leverage that knowledge into those domains are more likely to remain innovative over time (see Cattani, 2005 and 2006) . This stream of research has significantly enhanced our understanding of the relationship among earlier experiences, innovation and firm performance. Yet, a systematic analysis of the specific mechanisms that firms can use in creating a new technology and developing a new business embodying this technology must be further investigated. Drawing from Roberts and Berry's (1985) basic distinction between internal and external development, we focus on the following mechanisms: the role of internal vs. collaborative R&D; the breadth of firm's search behaviour; the scope of this firm's R&D activity; the importance of individual inventors relative to teams of inventors in new technology developments. These mechanisms differ with respect to the locus where the relevant knowledge resides (i.e. inside or outside firm boundaries), but also the type of search firms engage in. An important implication of studying the role of these mechanisms and their relative importance over time is to shed light on the conditions enhancing incumbents' ability to create new (radical) technologies.
Mechanisms for leveraging existing knowledge in new technology development
It is widely accepted in strategy and innovation research that many new technologies are not entirely original. Even some of the most important inventions originate from the assimilation of pre-existing elements into new syntheses (Usher, 1929; Schumpeter, 1934) . As Basalla (1988) puts it, "… key artifacts -such as the steam engine, the cotton gin, or the transistoremerged in an evolutionary fashion from their antecedents. [These examples] illustrate the evolutionary hypothesis despite the fact that initially they appear to be excellent candidates for use in supporting the contrary discontinuous explanation."
Firms can occasionally experiment with technologies that focus on completely de novo solutions, namely technologies without clear technological antecedents (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001 ). Yet such instances are very rare at best. If indeed many new technologies stem from novel syntheses of existing elements, two related questions must be addressed. First, we need to establish whether the relevant knowledge resides within or outside firm boundaries and second, we need to identify the specific mechanisms used in producing such new syntheses.
Internal vs. collaborative R&D
We begin by arguing that one of the options available to firms is to create a new technology primarily in-house, i.e. through internal R&D. This type of strategic decision is consistent with the case of 'organic' growth as described in Penrose's (1959) seminal work. As a bundle of potential services, resources-especially knowledge-based resources -offer a relatively wide range of alternative applications. The underlying logic is akin to the idea that firms can seize new investment opportunities by leveraging their core competencies (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990) . Unlike other tangible resources (e.g. physical capital), core competencies are typically knowledge-based and therefore non-rivalrous in use. The range of possible applications for them is therefore wider than firms can anticipate (Garud and Nayyar, 1994) . Core competencies are building blocks for new technology developments.
Alternatively, firms can form a partnership (e.g. alliances, joint ventures) with other firms to gain access to and/or create novel technologies (e.g. Killing, 1982; Roberts and Berry, 1985; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Nagarajan and Mitchell, 1998) . For instance, a joint venture between two firms is encouraged when 'one or both firms desire to acquire the other's organisational know-how …' (Kogut, 1988) . By the same token, in technology intensive industries (e.g. biotechnology) where innovations tend to be more 'radical' in nature (Pisano, 1994) , firms are confronted with the 'need to seek knowledge from multiple areas both inside and outside of firm boundaries ' (DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999) . For example, new drug developments often embody knowledge created through the R&D efforts of other firms, academic institutions or research labs (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003) . Other studies (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Stuart, 1998; Ahuja, 2000) have highlighted the role of R&D alliances in providing innovative knowledge not available inside the firm.
Exploration vs. exploitation
As research on learning has pointed out, firms have 'to cope with confusing experience and the complicated problem of balancing the competing goals of developing new knowledge (i.e. exploration) and exploiting current competencies in the face of dynamic tendencies to emphasise one or the other' (Levinthal and March, 1993) . Regardless of whether a new technology is developed internally or in collaboration with a partner, a firm's R&D tends to be closely related to its previous R&D. Firms search locally and the likelihood that they will be searching within the boundaries of their existing knowledge domain, even after forming a partnership, remains high. Yet, the extent to which firms engage in local search varies from firm to firm: while some firms display a high propensity to explore, others tend to search in the neighbourhood of an existing application domain (Stuart and Podolny, 1996) . Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) 's study on optical disk, for example, shows how firms whose R&D activity spanned both organisational boundaries (cited other firms' patents) and technological boundaries (cited patents filed in other technical fields than that of the citing patent) on average performed better (their patents were more widely cited by subsequent patents) than firms that did not span either boundaries. Boundary-spanning firms are more likely to engage in exploration and thereby access new, non-redundant, knowledge that they can use in developing new technologies.
R&D scope
Firms also differ with respect to the scope of their inventive activities -as reflected, for instance, in their patent records (e.g. Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Darby et al., 1999; Cockburn et al., 2000) . While some firms concentrate their R&D on while some firms concentrate their R&D on several, more or less related, technical fields, others tend to focus on those fields in which their core technical competencies reside. For example, Honda has historically leveraged its core engine technology in such applications as cars, motorbikes, mowers and so on. Since new investment opportunities often grow out of a firm's core technologies, firms that remain focused in their R&D stand a better chance of developing new technologies leading to the emergence of new businesses. By developing absorptive capacity in a few related domains, firms will in fact be able to recognise the value of new, external knowledge, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 ).
Team vs. individual inventors
Finally, new syntheses can be attained by individual inventors alone or a team of inventors working together. Earlier research has shown how the availability of individuals with important idiosyncratic skills and knowledge accounts for stable performance differences among firms (e.g. Pennings et al., 1998; Hitt et al., 2001 ). Human capital is indeed one of a firm's critical, if not most critical, resources. Such intangible resources tend to be rare, difficult to imitate and substitute and not always readily available on the market (e.g. Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) . The idea that a firm's employees are a source of enduring performance differences is hardly new (Penrose, 1959; Pfeffer, 1994; Coff, 1997) . Recently, however, this idea has received more attention on the grounds that knowledge lies at the core of an organisation's competitive advantage (Grant, 1996; Rumelt, 1984) . For instance, Zucker et al. (1998) found the fortunes of biotechnology companies to be significantly linked to their engagement of 'star scientists'. Inventors play a key role in forming ties to the scientific community because the way firms 'access and practice science -in particular, whether they establish credible linkages with the scientific community -matters to the production of valuable innovations' (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003) .
While the creation of a new technology might result from the inventive efforts of individual inventors, within an organisation such an outcome typically involves the efforts of several inventors working as a research team. Like within the scientific community broadly defined (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003) , scientific knowledge is embedded in all inventors in the same firm. Inventors with different scientific backgrounds working together on the same project facilitate the diffusion and recombination of skills and knowledge accumulated in otherwise distinct technological domains.
We believe that a joint consideration of the above mechanisms helps clarify how established firms create new (radical) technologies. We are not suggesting here that some mechanisms are more effective than others and therefore firms should use them. As we argued before, such mechanisms are distinct but complementary. The objective is to gauge their relative importance as a new technology is first invented, then perfected and tested in field experiments and finally brought to commercial applications. In Section 3, we provide empirical evidence in support of our theoretical reasoning by looking at Corning's pioneering work and subsequent developments in fibre optics.
Empirical analysis
The analysis focuses on Corning's invention and development of fibre optics between 1970 and 1995 2 . We chose Corning as our research setting for several reasons. First, our objective was to study a technology developed through the R&D of an established firm that leveraged its knowledge base into a new domain (long-distance telecommunications). Moreover, given Corning's long history as a highly innovative and R&D-oriented company, the invention of fibre optics was one on a list of several such inventions. Finally, we wanted that technology to be recent enough to be able to interview people who were directly involved in its development. The analysis is organised as follows. We begin by estimating the relative importance of the mechanisms described above and their evolution over time; then we use the qualitative evidence to interpret and clarify the results. Before we do so, however, in Section 3.1, we offer a succinct timeline of the evolution of fibre optics.
The industry: a brief history
The possibility of using optical glass fibres over long-distances was first shown in 1970 when Robert Maurer, Donald Keck and Peter Schultz from Corning developed the first low-loss optical glass fibre. The two key patents -Fused Silica Optical Waveguide (No. 3659915) and Method of Producing Optical Waveguide Fibres (No. 3711262) -were in fact filed on 11 May 1970. The invention largely grew out of Corning's long-standing experience with various types of specialty glass and in other technical fields like light scattering, quantum optics (glass-based lasers) and electronics (Table 1 summarises some of these crucial technological antecedents). The theoretical possibility of using light for communications purposes, however, had been envisioned a few years earlier by two researchers, Charles K. Kao and George Hockham, from the Standard Telecommunications Laboratories (STL), the British subsidiary of ITT. Shortly before, the company had formed a research team to study the properties of optical waveguides to satisfy the needs of the British Post Office, which at the time operated the British telephone network and was trying to renew the telecommunications infrastructure of the UK. The British Post Office was evaluating the possibility of replacing traditional copper-based fibre with optical glass fibres. At the Institution of Electrical Engineers meeting held in London in 1966, Kao and Hockham (1966) presented a paper in which they argued that optical fibres would be a suitable transmission medium for long-distance communications if attenuation (i.e. loss of signal strength due to impurities in the materials) could be kept under 20 dB km -1 . This implied that one percent of the light entering a waveguide would remain after traveling one kilometer. By setting this threshold Kao and Hockham (1966) suggested the proper direction to follow, spurring the first wave of large-scale laboratory experiments.
Corning's invention of the first optical glass fibre with attenuation below 20 dB km -1 in 1970 and its subsequent refinements during the early 1970s, fundamentally shaped the evolution of optical communications by demonstrating for the first time optical fibre's commercial viability for long-distance telephone networks. After 1970 Corning experimented with the new technology in pilot plants and conducted several field experiments to understand more deeply the properties of the materials used in the production of fibres, improve their quality and lower production costs. Corning thus formed several partnerships with cable-makers such as Siemens in Germany, Pirelli in Italy, BICC in UK, public labs in France and Furukawa in Japan. Corning agreed to licence its patents and know-how to make waveguides in the origin country of each partner who was expected to develop waveguide components and cables. Through these partnerships Corning collected annual fees to fund its R&D efforts in fibre optics. The potential risk of granting partners the right to produce fibres was to give away its know-how. In order to compete in optical fibre, therefore, Corning had to be the technological market leader by continuously improving existing processes and new product development. It complemented this strategy by defending its intellectual property aggressively on the premise that its know-how was the key isolating mechanism to secure a viable market position, retain the technological lead and garner yields accruing to its R&D.
In the early 1980s, the commercial success of fibre optics was still uncertain. By 1982, Corning's fibre optics business was generating about US$10 million in revenues up from only US$1 million in 1975, but no significant profits. The European joint ventures with telecom companies (e.g. Siemens in Germany, Telecom in France and Sumitomo in Japan) were also only marginally profitable. Most of the sales consisted of experimental trials -e.g. samples of optical fibres sold to phone companies interested in testing the potential of light transmission or small orders placed by independent phone companies. Until 1980, large-scale applications for optical fibre cables and related technologies remained rare in the US -in the order of about US$40 million (Fortune, 1980) -largely because of AT&T's de facto monopoly in the long-distance telephone market and its commitment to traditional copper-based cables.
Corning's sustained commitment to fibre optics helped it to extend its advantage over competitors such as AT&T, ITT and Sumitomo. Corning, however, benefited immeasurably from two pivotal events. First, in 1982, MCI decided to build the first long-distance telephone network in the US using single-mode optical fibres to counter AT&T's power in the long-distance network market. It purchased 100,000 km of optical glass fibres from Corning for US$90 million, by far the biggest order that Corning had received. GTE Sprint and US Telecom followed MCI, placing orders of similar magnitude (Magaziner and Patinkin, 1989; Graham and Shuldiner, 2001) . Demand in North America increased from 200,000 km in 1982 to 1,600,000 km in 1986 (Morone, 1993) .
In 1986, Corning sold optical fibres for more than US$220 million -about 12% of Corning's total sales that year, with operating margins of over 23% (Dyer and Gross, 2001 ). Second, the government's forced split-up of AT&T in 1984 was a boon to Corning. From this split-up, eight firms emerged, AT&T and seven regional service providers. The split-up not only aided competition in the long-distance market but also 'allowed entrepreneurial companies to challenge the existing technologies and embrace optical fibre to build new telecom networks' (Keck, 2000) .
On April 28, 1989, Corning decided to drop 'Glass Works' from the company name. The rationale behind this decision is captured by James Houghton who once said: '(T)he new name acknowledges the transformation of the company beyond its historic base in glass…. We will remain the No. 1 company in the field of specialty glass and specialty ceramics' (Gannett News Service, 1989) . The overall portfolio of businesses was streamlined and the focus progressively shifted towards telecommunications -which by 1985 had become 'a major contributor to income from operations' (Annual Report, 1985) . More recently, the deregulation of the telecommunications industry by the Telecommunications Act in 1996 further bolstered the use of fibre optics.
Data
In the analysis we used different types of data, namely patent, archival and interview data collected over a period spanning more than 3 years.
Patent data
Patents provide a detailed and consistent chronology of when certain skills and knowledge were originally created (Katila and Ahuja, 2002) . While patents do not measure all relevant knowledge held by a firm (for a detailed analysis of this issue, see Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006 forthcoming), prior research has increasingly employed them as a measure of firm knowledge (e.g. Narin et al., 1987; Albert et al., 1991; Jaffe et al., 1993; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) and as an indicator of technological capabilities (Jaffe, 1986; Patel and Pavitt, 1994; Silverman, 1999 . Unlike R&D expenditures, they offer information on a firm's specific strengths.
To identify the technology underlying optical fibres as accurately as possible, we conducted the analysis at the patent sub-class level ( Table 2 ). The relevant patent primary classes and sub-classes were double-checked with two firms in the sample to ensure a precise and comprehensive coverage of the relevant technical fields. We also validated our interpretation of the data with these firms. We collected patent data from the National Bureau for Economic Research, the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Cassis databases and Micropatents. Over the study period Corning filed 6085 patents (either separately or jointly with its partners) of which 1192 were in fibre optics, i.e. about 20% of the total. Among these 1192 fibre optics patents, 796 (i.e. about 67%) were filed by Corning alone, while the remaining 396 with its partners.
Detailed information about patents filed before 1976 is not presently available electronically. Since the creation of the variables of theoretical interest requires detailed information (assignee, filing year, patent class, etc.) for all patents filed over the study period, we retrieved relevant information manually from the US Patents and Trademark Office's official website whenever possible. As a result, the database is distinctive because it captures as accurately as possible all earlier work relevant to the development of fibre optics.
Table 2
Patent primary classes and sub-classes 1-35, 60.1-65, 102-121, 134.1-137, 157-192, 268-301, 335, 346, 348-362, 370.1, 374.1-540 
Patent primary classes Patent sub-classes
65 Glass manufacturing 17.
Archival data
We collected data on fibre optics and its evolution from multiple data sources internal (annual reports, organisation charts and technical papers available on the company web site) and external (specialised books, newspaper articles, academic papers, case studies and industry reports) to Corning. 
Interview data
We gathered additional data and information through three rounds of semi-structured interviews with Corning's R&D managers. During our first visit to Corning's photonics plant in March 2002, we interviewed five managers with different functional background with the help of a research assistant. Among the interviewees was Donald Keck, one of the three inventors of the first low-loss optical glass fibre in 1970, who at the time was directing optics and photonics research activities. The interviews lasted from 1-3 hours each. Since the interviewees were present at different times in Corning's history, we could reconstruct more accurately how fibre optics emerged. As a result, they experienced the development of fibre optics and the events that led to the emergence of a new market for it. At the end of this visit, we compared our notes with those of our research assistant, discussed differences and listed issues requiring further clarification.
We further validated our analysis and interpretation of relevant events by conducting a 3 h phone interview with Tom MacAvoy, former Corning president, in the spring of year 2004. He experienced the phase 'before' and 'after' the emergence of fibre optics and played a critical role in its development. He helped us identify some of the critical factors and events that led to Corning's invention of fibre optics, i.e. key people, technological antecedents and strategic decisions and initiatives. We also questioned the interviewee about the timeline in fibre optics development. Since our interviewee went through all these phases and was also one the key decision-makers, we asked him explicitly how Corning recognised of having a stock of knowledge that could be leveraged in fibre optics and actually used it to create a new business.
During our third and last visit to Corning in May 2005, we met with Donald Keck, at the time retired Vice President and Executive Director of Research, Alfred Michelson, former Head of Corning Legal Department, Stuart Sammis, Corning Chief Archivist and Tom MacAvoy, Corning Former President, who played a critical role in arranging the visit and involving the other interviewees. The meeting lasted about 8 h and proved a unique opportunity to clarify some important issues and collect additional data. While Keck and MacAvoy experienced most of the events before, during and after the invention of fibre optics, Michelson joined Corning a few years later and Sammis even more recently. This somehow heterogeneous composition of the group of interviewees had two major advantages. First, different recollections of important decisions, initiatives and events and different perspectives on specific issues could be contrasted and compared. Second, during the discussion strong agreement on many important questions was achieved.
Besides helping us to identify more precisely some crucial technological antecedents and organisational factors which favoured the emergence of fibre optics, the triangulation resulting from multiple and distinct data collection reduces the risk of our retrospectively imposing meaning on historical events from our knowledge of outcomes (Aldrich, 2000) . We used this body of qualitative evidence to interpret and further corroborate the results of the statistical analysis.
Depedent variable
Our dependent variable measures the number of future citations a fibre optics patent received in subsequent years. This measure of patent impact provides a better estimate of a patent true value (e.g. Griliches 1981 Griliches , 1990 Trajtenberg 1990a,b) and its relevance for the development of a new technology (here fibre optics). For all patents in the sample we collected future citations up to April 2004 from Micropatents. Since patents filed in earlier years are exposed to the risk of being cited for a longer period, we compared patents only to those filed during the same year. All of the focal patents were issued before February, 1996: as a result, they have remained at risk of being cited for at least 8 years. For each patent, we counted all future citations net of Corning's self-citations. While self-citations measure the extent to which a firm builds upon its previous R&D efforts, citations from other firms more objectively estimate the actual relevance of a firm's patents. Following Trajtenberg (1990a,b) , the dependent variable estimating the impact of a fibre optics patent is computed as an index of weighed citation counts -(1 + C) -where C is the number of future citations that patent j (1, …, m) filed in year t (1970, …, 1996) received in subsequent years (until year 2004) from patents filed by other firms.
Independent variables

Internal vs. collaborative R&D
Firms can develop new technologies in-house through internal R&D or in collaboration with other firms by forming various types of partnership. In the case of Corning, joint ventures were the most frequently form of partnership being used -at least during the study period. Although acquisitions represent another avenue, Corning almost never used this mechanism in the development of fibre optics at least during the study period (Morone, 1993) . Accordingly, we created the variable Corning Patent, a dummy that takes on the value 1 every time Corning filed a patent in fibre optics alone, 0 otherwiselike when it filed a patent through a joint venture.
Internal vs. external knowledge
Firms can accumulate skills and knowledge in a new domain by learning from direct experience or the experience of others (Levitt and March, 1988) . Firms that cite patents filed by other firms are more likely to access external knowledge and expand their base of experience than are firms that continually cite their own patents. Earlier research has shown that exploration spanning firm boundaries influences technological evolution in a given domain more than exploration that does not span firm boundaries (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001 ). We then created two variables which denote the number of backward citations made to patents filed by Corning itself (Internal Knowledge) or other firms (External Knowledge) in the past, respectively. Both variables were entered into the model after taking the log.
Team vs. individual patents
While the creation of a new technology might result from the inventive efforts of individual inventors, typically within an organisation such an outcome involves the efforts of several inventors working as a research team. We thus controlled for whether any new patent in fibre optics was the outcome of the inventive efforts of a single inventor or a team of inventors, by creating a continuous variable that measures the number of inventors who filed a new fibre optic patent in a given year.
R&D scope
We accounted for the scope of Corning's patenting activity in a given year using the Herfindahl index of concentration as follows,
where k is the index of the patent primary classes in which Corning filed at least 100 patents over the study period (classes with less of 100 patents were all included in a residual category); n is the number of different patent classes in which Corning filed a patent; N k is the number of patents Corning filed in patent class k; and N is the total number of patents Corning filed in a given year. The index can take on any value between zero and one (included): while higher values indicate that Corning's R&D concentrated on a fewer technical fields relevant for fibre optics (see Table 2 ), lower values correspond to the case when Corning spread its R&D over several other technical fields. Indeed, Corning occasionally stray from its core technologies on specialty glass and ceramics to create new businesses (for a more comprehensive analysis see Morone, 1993; Cattani, 2006) . The acquisition of Signetics in 1962, motivated by the intention to enter into electronics and the promising integrated circuits business, is a case in point. These forays into markets for which Corning could not build on its core technologies did not always prove to be successful (Signetics was sold off in 1975). We corrected for the bias in Herfindahl-type measures based on count data by applying the correction suggested by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) as follows:
where is an unbiased estimator of the true measure of the scope of each inventor's patenting activity.
Controls
We accounted for possible alternative explanations for the results by including several control variables in the final model specification.
R&D expenditures
Several studies have documented the relation between a firm's patenting activity and R&D expenditures (Griliches, 1981 (Griliches, , 1990 Hausman et al., 1984) . We used the log of yearly R&D, expressed in 1995 constant dollars, as a proxy for a firm's total R&D inputs to the innovation process. We obtained data from Compustat.
Average patent impact
Regardless of their quality, on average recent patents are less frequently cited than older patents simply because they have being exposed to the risk of being cited for a shorter period. For each year, we thus estimated the average number of citations, Average Patent Impact, fibre optics patents received from other patents in subsequent years. We computed this measure including all patents filed in the relevant classes/subclasses by any type of assignee (whether a public or a private firms, an academic institutions or an individual inventor).
Time
Based on our knowledge of fibre optics timeline we divided up the study period into three sub-periods. The reason for doing so is to keep track of the pattern of Corning's patenting activity in fibre optics as compared to other technical fields. Variations in the number of patents filed over time are contingent on evolving investment opportunities. Not until the early 1980s did actually Corning begin to profit from the emerging fibre optics business. Despite the initial tepid acceptance of optical glass fibres, Corning accumulated the knowledge and expertise needed to become a major competitor later on. The major boost in the number of patents after MCI's decision of using optical glass fibres for its longdistance telephone network and AT&T's first break-up in 1984 injected more competition into the telecommunication industry and fostered the replacement of copperbased fibres with optical glass fibres in the long-distance segment of the industry. On 28 April 1989, Corning decided to drop 'Glass Works' from the company name to stress its transformation beyond its historic base in glass. We then created three dummiesPeriod 1, Period 2 and Period 3 -for each sub-period -i.e. 1970-1983, 1984-1989 and 1990-1995 -using the last sub-period (1990-1995) as the reference category. In short, Period 1 (1970 Period 1 ( -1983 embraces the years when Corning (at that time still Corning Glass Works) started patenting in fibre optics, conducted the first field experiments and began to sell fibres in small batches mostly outside the US. During Period 2 (1984 Period 2 ( -1989 Corning increasingly steered its R&D towards fibre optics to accommodate the rapid growth in market demand, especially after MCI's decision to use optical glass fibres and the end of AT&T's monopolistic position in the long-distance market. Finally, Period 3 (1990-1995) witnessed an increase in the relative importance of the Telecommunications segment, right before the deregulation of the industry in 1996 and the advent of the internet.
Model
Since the dependent variable, Weighed Citation Index, can take on only non-negative integer values, a Poisson or a negative binomial specification is recommended (Hausman et al. 1984) . In the Poisson distribution, both the mean and the variance are equal to the single parameter , which is a function of the explanatory variables -i.e. Allison, 1999) . In the presence of over-dispersion -as in our data -the variance tends to be greater than the mean. While over-dispersion does not bias the coefficient estimates, standard errors might be underestimated and chi-square values statistics overestimated. We thus included the stochastic component it that allows for the effect of omitted explanatory variables to correct for this problem as follows:
where exp( it ) ~ [1, ]; i.e. it is assumed to have a gamma distribution. The subscripts i and t indicate that the parameter is allowed to vary across patents (i = 1, …, n) and time (t = 1, …, m). In this formulation of the negative binomial model, the parameter is estimated directly from the data and captures over-dispersion. Since (Weighted Citation Index) cannot be less than 0, it is generally expressed as a log-linear function of the covariates. After including the main explanatory variables, Equation (a) becomes:
In the analysis, we report significance levels based on Huber-White robust standard errors to control for any residual heteroscedasticity. We obtained our estimates using PROC GENMOD in SAS (version 9.1).
Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the descriptive statistics and the correlation values for all variables. The correlation values are relatively low. We also checked for the existence of multicollinearity by computing the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) using PROC REG in SAS (Allison, 1999) , and found multicollinearity not to be a problem. (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) is the reference category.
For the Corning Patent dummy variable the reference category accounts for the case when a patent was filed in collaboration with another firm. -period (1970-1983 ) is the reference category against which Period 2 and Period 3 are compared. Even when we directly compared Period 2 and Period 3 using the contrast command in SAS, we found no statistical difference between them. The amount of resources Corning allocated to R&D has the expected positive and statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. The coefficient of the average patent impact at the industry (i.e. fibre optics) level is in the expected direction, but not statistically significant. Thus, Corning's patent impact in a given year is not affected by the average number of citations received by fibre optics patents at the industry level filed in the same year. Model 2 reports the results after we entered the first variable of theoretical interest, Corning Patent. The variable is a dummy distinguishing between fibre optic patents, which Corning filed independently or in collaboration with a partner (the reference category). The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that Corning was more likely to file a fibre optic patent of greater impact alone than through partnerships 3 . Also, the overall fit of the model improves as indicated by the decrease in the Deviance value.
Model 3 presents the results after we included the second variable of theoretical interest, Team Patent. The coefficient is in the expected direction but not statistically significant. Although the results are not reported in the table, we also estimated a model with an interaction term between the Team Patent and Corning Patent variables and found that a patent filed by a team of inventors from Corning only had, on average, greater impact.
Model 4 reports the results after we entered the third and the forth variable of theoretical interest, i.e. Internal Knowledge and External Knowledge. The coefficients are both statistically significant and in the expected direction. Consistent with earlier research (e.g. Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) , exploration spanning firm boundaries influences technological evolution in a given domain (fibre optics) more than exploration that does not span firm boundaries. Again, the inclusion of these two variables improves the overall fit of the model.
Model 5 is the full model including the variable R&D Scope, which measures the scope of Corning's R&D activity. As the results indicate, Corning was likely to file a fibre optics patent of greater impact when it concentrated its R&D activity in fields relevant to fibre optics (see Table 2 ) in which it had accumulated over time its core technologies, instead of spreading such efforts over many others technical fields. Taken together, the results provide strong evidence that Corning invented and then developed fibre optics mainly internally by building on its core technologies in glass and glass ceramics as well as by engaging in exploration.
Discussion
The previous results are consistent with qualitative evidence from archival data and especially our field interview data. Examination of these data further corroborates the statistical analysis. Looking into Corning's routines and practices and organisational context can help explain why Corning chose certain mechanisms and how their relative importance varied over time. First, the emphasis on the importance of scientific innovation has been an integral dimension of Corning's corporate culture virtually since its founding. In line with this strong R&D-oriented culture, for instance, in 1908 Corning had already established an R&D lab under the direction of Dr. Eugene Sullivan and in 1957 a new corporate R&D lab was built. This culture permeated the whole organisation and supported many important technological achievements. During the 1960s and the 1970s, the belief that technology was the key driving force of Corning's well-being became even more pervasive throughout the company. This belief contributed to creating an environment where new ideas and initiatives were consistently generated and errors/mistakes viewed as valuable learning opportunities. Researchers and scientists 'were given wide latitude and substantial resources and they were encouraged to pursue their interest -regardless of the immediacy of a financial payback' (Dyer and Gross, 2001) .
Consistent with this culture, Corning's senior researchers were encouraged to visit research labs and customers, attend conferences and so on. Moreover, one to three senior researchers who were well-known in the scientific community were selected as Corning's R&D ambassadors. This role of 'technology scouts' -somehow akin to that of gatekeepers (e.g. Allen, 1977; Allen, Tushman and Lee, 1979; -was intended to facilitate the acquisition and diffusion of critical knowledge, both technical and at the market level. This practice permeated Corning's search behaviour and enhanced its ability to develop new technologies internally building on existing core technical competencies.
Low turnover rates among managers, senior researchers and engineers ensured the continuity between past and current R&D. Previous research has argued that organisational memory does not necessarily coincide with individual memory (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Walsh and Ungson, 1991) . However, individuals are often 'the sole storage point of knowledge that is both idiosyncratic and of great importance to the organisation' (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . While problems tend to change continuously, the same body of knowledge can remain valuable as individuals 'recognise similarities between old solutions and new problems' (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997) . Retaining longtenured employees helped preserve the integrity of the firm's knowledge base and make new syntheses as novel opportunities came along.
Based on our interviews and other data sources, there is evidence that Corning's organisational context stimulated autonomous strategic initiatives, i.e. initiatives producing diversity and enabling firms to generate new combinations of productive resources, enact new environmental segments and sometimes prompt radical innovation (Burgelman, 1983) . In line with its strong R&D-oriented culture, Corning granted middle managers the latitude and the resources to pursue and develop new ideas/projects 4 . Finally, Corning has traditionally tried to develop its core technologies internally and formed partnerships with other firms with expertise in complementary technologies. In the case of fibre optics, optical glass fibres are but one component of an optical communications system (see Hecht, 1999) . Despite its expertise in specialty glass, Corning had limited or no earlier experience in other components such as cabling. It then tried to access other firms' expertise by partnering with them. In 1977, for example, Corning integrated vertically in cabling production by creating Siecor, a joint venture with Siemens, that has been its manufacturing arm for optical cables ever since.
All the previous conditions proved critical in facilitating the diffusion and recombination of knowledge accumulated in otherwise distinct technological domains, both inside and outside firm boundaries. Corning's R&D-oriented culture and its routines and practices created a context where the development of new technologies received strong support. Moreover, the formation of partnerships with other firms was not only instrumental in opening up new market opportunities but also helped Corning to get access to complementary technologies.
Conclusions
We began by arguing that established firms are responsible for a large number of innovations. In addition to building and expanding their absorptive capacity in a given domain, incumbents can develop new technologies by leveraging their existing knowledge into other domains. This argument rests on the premise that each invention or innovation offers a spectrum of opportunities, only a few of which will ever be developed during its lifetime (Basalla, 1988) . Firms can thus search for new applications for which their body of knowledge is potentially valuable (Cattani, 2005) . As a result of this search behaviour, significant innovations often come about. Besides clarifying the origins of radical innovations, our findings shed light on how established firms (like Corning) can remain innovative over time.
In this paper, our main objective was to establish the relative importance of various mechanisms firms can use in new technology developments. We drew attention to the following mechanisms: the role of internal vs. collaborative R&D, the breadth of firm's search behaviour; the scope of a firm R&D activity; the extent to which a new technology is developed by individual inventors or a team of inventors. Firms and particularly established firms, can use these mechanisms to enhance their ability to innovate. We corroborated the results of the statistical analysis with evidence from archival and interview data. This qualitative evidence highlighted some critical conditions that enhanced Corning's ability to innovate and benefit from its past R&D. As the previous analysis has shown, Corning invented and developed fibre optics technology primarily internally. Partnerships with other firms -mostly joint ventures with telecommunications companies such as Siemens or Sumitomo -were essentially used to gain access to the final market and acquire complementary assets (e.g. distribution channels) not available internally (Morone, 1993) .
The paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of incumbents in new technology developments. In his earlier work Schumpeter (1934) stressed that small entrepreneurial firms were likely to be the sources of innovation. However, in his later work (Schumpeter, 1942) claimed that large established firms were likely to be the drivers behind innovation (for a deeper discussion, see Nelson and Winter, 1982; and particularly Winter, 1984) . Subsequent work has argued that "differential incentives will lead incumbents to drive forward with incremental innovations, whereas entrepreneurial new entrants will pioneer radical innovations" (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) .
This study questions this perspective by showing how incumbents are often the engine of radical innovations, especially when they consistently leverage their technological knowledge base into a new application domain (see also Levinthal, 1998; Cattani, 2005 and 2006) . Fibre optics is only one technology in a list of many breakthrough technologies (e.g. the glass for Thomas Edison's first light bulb, Pyrex bake-ware, flame hydrolysis process to produce fused silica, the fusion process of liquid crystal displays, etc.) Corning pioneered since its foundation in 1851. As we noted before, Corning's R&D-oriented culture, organisational routines and practices and organisational context enhanced its ability to innovate consistently over time.
There are some obvious limitations to the study. First, the analysis focuses on one technology and thereby it is unclear whether the findings can be generalised. Yet, the identified mechanisms are general and rooted in extant strategy and innovation research. Future research comparing and contrasting the evolution of different technologies will verify whether the same dynamics can be detected in other firms. On the other hand, one of the strengths of an in-depth case study is to offer a finer description of the micro-level determinants of new technology developments.
Second, despite their many useful applications patent data exhibit some shortcomings. While patents have been increasingly used as a measure of firm knowledge, they do not fully measure a firm's overall base of experience. For instance, even though reference to earlier art -i.e. citations to patents by other patents -has been a core methodology in research on social, organisational and geographic pathways of knowledge flows, citations made by patent examiners have not been separated out from citations made by inventors (Alcacer and Gittelman, forthcoming) . However, unlike studies comparing knowledge flows across very different industries, focusing on a single firm with a high propensity to patent and a technology targeting a market where patents are important for appropriating returns to R&D and the use of qualitative evidence from our archival and interview helped us mitigate this problem.
Finally, we recognise that some of the variables we used in the analysis and especially they way we decide to operationalise the theoretical constructs, might appear rather crude. For example, the team variable simply measures the number of inventors responsible for a patent. Drawing from social network theory, for instance, a more accurate measure should capture the extent to which inventors tend to collaborate through repeated interaction. Given the exploratory character of this study, however, our objective was to identify particular patterns rather than present conclusive results. Some of the present shortcomings, therefore, represent avenues for future research.
